Linux Kernel BPF JIT Spraying (grsecurity forums)

Over at the grsecurity forums, Brad Spengler writes about a recently released proof of concept attack on the kernel using JIT spraying. "What happened next was the hardening of the BPF interpreter in grsecurity to prevent such future abuse: the previously-abused arbitrary read/write from the interpreter was now restricted only to the interpreter buffer itself, and the previous warn on invalid BPF instructions was turned into a BUG() to terminate execution of the exploit. I also then developed GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW which killed off the stack overflow class of vulns on x64.A short time later, there was work being done upstream to extend the use of BPF in the kernel. This new version was called eBPF and it came with a vastly expanded JIT. I immediately saw problems with this new version and noticed that it would be much more difficult to protect -- verification was being done against a writable buffer and then translated into another writable buffer in the extended BPF language. This new language allowed not just arbitrary read and write, but arbitrary function calling." The protections in the grsecurity kernel will thus prevent this attack. In addition, the newly released RAP feature for grsecurity, which targets the elimination of return-oriented programming (ROP) vulnerabilities in the kernel, will also ensure that "the fear of JIT spraying goes away completely", he said.