UK Home Secretary Doesn't Want Backdoors; She Just Wants Companies To Stop Offering Encryption Because No One Wants It

UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd, perhaps now most famously known for not knowing the "necessary hashtags," is back to beating up on encryption because it (no citation provided) helps terrorists get away with terrorism. Her op-ed piece for The Telegraph begins as so many pleas to undermine encryption do: with the horrors perpetrated by terrorists. Only now, the parade of horrors tends to sound something like a "CSI: Cyber" exposition outtake.

Nearly every plot we uncover has a digital element to it. Go online and you will find your own "do-it-yourself" jihad at the click of a mouse. The tentacles of Daesh (Isil) recruiters in Syria reach back to the laptops in the bedrooms of boys - and increasingly girls - in our towns and cities up and down the country. The purveyors of far-Right extremism pump out their brand of hate across the globe, without ever leaving home.

The scale of what is happening cannot be downplayed. Before he mowed down the innocents on Westminster Bridge and stabbed Pc Keith Palmer, Khalid Masood is thought to have watched extremist videos. Daesh claim to have created 11,000 new social media accounts in May alone. Our analysis shows that three-quarters of Daesh propaganda stories are shared within the first three hours of release - an hour quicker than a year ago.

An hour quicker! In internet time, that's practically a millennium. It's tough to tell what Rudd's attempting to make of this technobabble. Is she suggesting future Masoods will act quicker because they'll be able to complete their viewing of extremist videos faster? If that's the case, maybe regulators need to step in and throttle broadband connections. The more the video buffers, the less likely it is someone will watch it" and the less likely it is someone will carry out an attack. The math(s) work out.

Unfortunately, this is not where the op-ed is heading. Sadly, Rudd is here to take a swing at encryption. But she takes a swing at it in prime passive-aggressive, Ike Turner-style, saying she loves it even as the blows rain home.

Encryption plays a fundamental role in protecting us all online. It is key to growing the digital economy, and delivering public services online.

I ain't mad at ya.

But, like many powerful technologies, encrypted services are used and abused by a small minority of people. The particular challenge is around so called "end-to-end" encryption, where even the service provider cannot see the content of a communication.

But you mess me up so much inside.

To be very clear - Government supports strong encryption and has no intention of banning end-to-end encryption. But the inability to gain access to encrypted data in specific and targeted instances - even with a warrant signed by a Secretary of State and a senior judge - is right now severely limiting our agencies' ability to stop terrorist attacks and bring criminals to justice.

In a fun twist, Rudd doesn't call for harder nerding. (Note: Rudd is visiting Silicon Valley to meet with tech leaders, so it's safe to assume requests for harder nerding will be made, even if not directly in this op-ed.)

No, Rudd doesn't want the impossible: secure, backdoored encryption. Instead, she wants to know if tech companies will just take the encryption off one end of the end-to-end. Her bolstering argument? The public doesn't give a shit about encryption. It just wants easy-to-use communication tools.

Real people often prefer ease of use and a multitude of features to perfect, unbreakable security. So this is not about asking the companies to break encryption or create so called "back doors". Who uses WhatsApp because it is end-to-end encrypted, rather than because it is an incredibly user-friendly and cheap way of staying in touch with friends and family? Companies are constantly making trade-offs between security and "usability", and it is here where our experts believe opportunities may lie.

Having set up her straw app user, Rudd moves towards her conclusion" which is severely lacking in anything cohesive or coherent. The "opportunities" lie in persuading tech companies to provide users with less secure communications platforms. Should be an easy sale, especially if the average user doesn't care about security. But maybe the company does and doesn't want to give bad people an easy way to access the communications of others. Hence encryption. Hence end-to-end, so even if the provider is breached, there's still nothing to access.

What Rudd is looking for can't be called a trade-off. The government has nothing tech companies want. All they can offer is platitudes about fighting crime and national security. The government, meanwhile, wants tech companies to write software the way the government wants it, rather than how the company or its users want it. That's not a trade-off. That's a one-way street where every internet communication platform becomes a proxy government agency.

Rudd's idea is bad and she should feel bad. But I get the feeling that no matter how many tech experts she talks to, she's still going to believe her way is the right and best way.