FCC Freaks Out About Huawei, But Ignores The Internet Of Broken Things

Despite a lack of public evidence proving Huawei spies on American citizens (the entire justifying cornerstone of the effort), the FCC this week just dramatically escalated the Trump administration's blackballing of Chinese telecom firms. In a fact sheet circulated by the agency, the FCC says it will vote in November on a new rule that would ban US companies from receiving taxpayer subsidies if they use Huawei, ZTE, or other Chinese gear in their networks. This could be followed later with additional rules requiring that companies rip Chinese gear from their networks and replace it with presumably US alternatives, the FCC says.

To hear FCC boss Ajit Pai tell it, the blackballing effort will protect US national security and protect us as we nobly endeavor to win the "race to 5G":

"When it comes to 5G and America's security, we can't afford to take a risk and hope for the best. We need to make sure our networks won't harm our national security, threaten our economic security, or undermine our values. The Chinese government has shown repeatedly that it is willing to go to extraordinary lengths to do just that.

And Chinese law requires all companies subject to its jurisdiction to secretly comply with demands from Chinese intelligence services. As the United States upgrades its networks to the next generation of wireless technologies-5G-we cannot ignore the risk that that the Chinese government will seek to exploit network vulnerabilities in order to engage in espionage, insert malware and viruses, and otherwise compromise our critical communications networks. "

Again, while neither Huawei nor China are innocent angels by any measure, this blackballing effort continues to have some problems. One being that the United States, with its history of spying on Huawei and using AT&T to spy on everybody else, we're not exactly treading the moral high ground on this subject. But there's also plenty of questions as to whether these efforts are above board, and whether they'll have their intended impact.

One, public evidence still seems like it's an afterthought. An eighteen month investigation by the White House in 2012 (the last time we had a bout of hyperventilation on this subject) showed there was no evidence of Huawei actively using its gear to spy on Americans. Other data indicates that much of the pearl clutching here is driven by giants like Cisco who just don't want to compete with cheaper Chinese gear. That's not to say there's no legitimate security worries here, just that protectionism is playing a role. How much a role is hard to determine without public evidence of Huawei spying.

Even then, there's questions as to whether this kind of blackballing would even accomplish its stated objective without causing additional problems. A lot of smaller, more rural-focused US companies have stated they will be financially harmed by eliminating their access to cheaper Huawei gear. The $8.5 billion Universal Service Fund (USF) has already been under fire by the Trump administration, and further curtailing what gear companies operating on tight budgets face could constrain efforts to improve America's woefully mediocre broadband infrastructure, including the so-called "race to 5G."

Meanwhile, our cybersecurity pearl clutching seems inconsistent. We're imposing vast new complicated rules on China while ignoring basic election security improvements. And while Chinese gear in telecom networks results in no limit of consternation, nobody at the FCC seems all that concerned with the millions of cheap-ass Chinese-made IOT gear we're affixing to our home and business networks. That tech, replete with flimsy security and privacy, creates a wonderful opportunity for foreign countries like China to spy on American residents and industry through everything from their "smart" TV to internet-connected tea kettle, yet government is doing bupkis about it.

Which leads one to wonder how much of the blacklisting of companies like Huawei is rooted in genuine cybersecurity concerns, and how much is being waged as leverage in Trump's counterproductive trade war? How much is cybersecurity fear being exploited to the benefit of Cisco? It's not clear, which is why countries like Germany have balked at US requests and responded by saying they'll simply adhere to existing security standards and practices. If it's a provably insecure router or other piece of gear, it doesn't get put onto the network. A broader blackballing could prove to create more problems than it solves.