Court Says It's Not Tortious Interference To Report Your Account Or Ask Twitter To Ban You

Laura Loomer, professional troll, these days seems most well known for all the internet platforms that have banned her:

Loomer is banned from Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Medium, Paypal, Venmo, GoFundMe, Uber and Lyft for violating their terms of service, in many cases by using hateful and Islamophobic speech.

That is a pretty impressive list right there. She's apparently trying to run for Congress to use that as an argument for why she should be let back onto these platforms, but so far that's not working either. She's also been suing companies for kicking her off the platform, which seems like a good way to get many lessons in how Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act works. In one such lawsuit, she also sued CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, arguing that CAIR's "reporting" of her Twitter account to Twitter violated all sorts of laws.

Spoiler alert: it did not. It does not violate any law whatsoever to report an account to Twitter.

The court dismissed a variety of claims for procedural reasons, leaving just a claim of "tortious interference of a business relationship," but that has also been dismissed for a bunch of reasons. First: the lack of any actual business relationship that CAIR could have possibly interfered with. Loomer and her lawyer argued that there was a business relationship between Loomer and her followers, and, separately, between Loomer and Twitter, but the Court was quick to issue a big fat "nope" to both ideas. First, the "business relationship" between Loomer and her followers:

With respect to the relationship between Loomer and her Twitter followers, the Court finds that Loomer has failed to establish an actual business relationship with identifiable customers.... As the Florida Supreme Court has made clear time and again, an action for tortious interference with a business relationship does not lie where the business relationship alleged is one with the "community at large" as opposed to one with identifiable customers.... Here, Plaintiffs fail to identify discernable customers and instead allege a business relationship with Loomer's Twitter community at large.

Specifically, Loomer contends that Defendant tortiously interfered with the business relationship between Loomer and her Twitter followers by convincing Twitter to ban Loomer from its platform. While the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true, Loomer's relationship with her Twitter followers-no matter how economically beneficial such a relationship may have been-is a relationship with the community at large, not with identifiable customers.... Given that Loomer's alleged business relationship with her followers does not sufficiently identify customers, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong of a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship.

What about her "business relationship" with Twitter? That, too, does not actually exist:

Similarly, with respect to Loomer's alleged business relationship with Twitter, Plaintiffs have pleaded nothing to suggest Loomer and Twitter had a business relationship as "evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would have been completed if the defendant had not interfered."... For starters, Count II of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting the existence of a business relationship between Loomer and Twitter. Still, at the Hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel argued that Defendant interfered with Loomer's right to use Twitter as a platform. However, when pressed to identify the nature of the business relationship between Loomer and Twitter, and Plaintiffs' corresponding legal rights pursuant to that relationship, Plaintiffs could not do so. Put simply, no business relationship can be inferred merely from Loomer's decision to use Twitter, and Defendant cannot be found liable for tortious interference with a business relationship where no business relationship has been established.

The court then goes even further and points out that even if Loomer could demonstrate a business relationship with Twitter (which she could not), it wouldn't matter anyway, thanks to CDA 230:

Moreover, even if Plaintiffs had established a business relationship between Loomer and Twitter, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. 230(b)(1)-(2), insulates internet providers, such as Twitter, from exactly the kind of liability Loomer now seeks to impose upon Defendant. Under the CDA, Twitter cannot be held liable for its decision to exercise traditional editorial functions, such as moderating content on its platform. Mezey v. Twitter, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-21069-KMM, 2018 WL 5306769, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2018). Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable for just that.

At the Hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel argued that by urging Twitter to ban Loomer, Defendant had interfered in Loomer and Twitter's business relationship. However, even accepting as true Plaintiffs' proposition that Defendant reported Loomer's account and convinced Twitter to ban Loomer, doing so does not create a cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship. Plaintiffs' suggestion that the mere reporting of a Twitter user-however insistent such reporting may be-is sufficient to constitute tortious interference in a business relationship between Twitter and the targeted user is, to put it mildly, nonsensical. A cause of action for tortious interference simply cannot exist each time an individual reports another Twitter user. And at the Hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel could not overcome this line-drawing problem. Put simply, Plaintiffs cannot use a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship as an end-run around the CDA's explicit prohibition that Twitter cannot be held liable for its decision to moderate content on its platform.

Why, yes, the argument is nonsensical, and that's probably why the court needed just six quick pages to dismiss the lawsuit.