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From TFA: "P.S. Secure hash functions are not for hashing passwords! Secure hash functions are building blocks in cryptographic protocols and they should be as efficient as possible while still being secure. Password-hashing functions are for impeding brute force guessing of passwords, and they should be as inefficient as possible while still being usable."

This is complete and utter BULLSHIT. Anybody who does not use SHA512 for a *NIX login password by now is a fool. Ask DOD if you don't believe me. It's the default in RHEL6, FreeBSD10 and many other modern security-conscious distros. Nobody runs just a single round of SHA512 for passwords. As the very next paragraph in TFA admits, you can make any algorithm as bloody slow as you want by running a large number of rounds. The default in glibc is 5000. You can turn up the number of rounds for passwords in PAM, up to at least 999,999,999 if you don't mind everybody logging in having to wait and load a CPU to 100% for minutes for the password to be verified (and making sure any attacker would take millenia to brute force a single password).