City Of Mesa Abusing Trademark Law To Punish City Council Candidate They Don't Like
And yes, that is a version of the Mesa city logo that he's using:
But to claim this is "trademark infringement"? That's crazy.Your use of City of Mesa trademarks in your political campaign ads, whatever your reason forincluding them, is trademark infringement. It implies an endorsement of your candidacy by theCity of Mesa and must stop immediately. The City of Mesa does not publically endorse anycandidate for Mesa City Council and has received complaints from the public and from othercandidates of your improper use of the trademarks. The City hereby demands you immediatelytake down and replace all signs and advertisements that include City of Mesa trademarks.Thankfully, Levy is on the case and understands all the many reasons the threat is completely bogus:
And, on top of that, Levy has sent a response letter to Mesa's lawyers raising these issues. As with pretty much any letter Levy sends, this one is worth reading. Here's part of it:There are several reasons why this demand is wrong - Whittaker is making a purely noncommercial use of the logo which is therefore outside the scope of the Lanham Act and, indeed, protected by the First Amendment, and, in any event, nothing about his material suggests that the city is behind his campaign. Beyond that, the logo is used to identify the city as the subject of his campaign for office, which is fair use.
And then there is this lurking problem: section 2(b) of the Lanham Act forbids the registration of any "flag or coat of arms or other insignia of . . . any State or municipality" as a trademark. The Trademark Office has apparently been using a narrow construction of this statutory limitation to allow agencies to register logos to identify specific government services or programs. A couple of years ago, a federal judge in New Jersey expressed grave reservations about the very idea of a government trademark in its own seal.
The lawyer who sent the demand letter is the same one who submitted the trademark registration a few years ago, claiming that it was only for limited specific programs and services. At the same time, the city's publicist was describing the graphic as "a new logo to replace the stylized 'M' that has branded the city for a generation." By identifying the symbol at issue as the city's official insignia, its lawyer might have unwittingly put his client's trademark registration at risk.
First, your effort to invoke the trademark laws to limit noncommercial political expressionis barred by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9thCir. 2005). That case involved the use of the plaintiff trademark as the domain name for anInternet "gripe site" in which Michael Kremer was criticizing the plaintiff company. The districtcourt dismissed Bosley's claims for trademark infringement and dilution, and the court of appealsaffirmed because "trademark infringement law prevents only unauthorized uses of a trademark inconnection with a commercial transaction in which the trademark is being used to confuse potentialconsumers." ... Like Kremer, Whittaker is not using the City's variouslogos to sell any goods or services, but only to identify the government body whose policies andoperation he hopes to improve by being elected to public office. Consequently, "[Mesa] cannot usethe Lanham Act either as a shield from [Whittaker]'s criticism, or as a sword to shut [Whittaker]up." ....And, of course, Levy also points out the possible problems with the trademark itself, which the city of Mesa might want to take note of:
Second, even if your client could show a commercial use of its marks, Whittaker hasemployed the marks to identify the subjects of his commentary, and is thus protected by the doctrineof nominative fair use, which has been recognized by the Ninth Circuit since New Kids on the Blockv. News America Publishing, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). Whittaker cannot meaningfully identifyhis candidacy without making clear that it is for the Mesa City Council that he is running, just as theartist whom Mattel sued for his parody of the Barbie doll had to use her likeness to make the pointof his parody clear. See Mattel v. Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). The city'ssuccess in letting its logo stand in as a shorthand for the city provides as well the necessity to use thelogo so that members of the public driving by his lawn signs or seeing his campaign literatureunderstand at a glance that he is a candidate for office in their city.
Third, your letter asserts that the placement of the city's logos on campaign material "falselyencourag[es] a public belief that [Whittaker is] endorsed by the City of Mesa." We see no likelihoodof confusion, and the fact (recited in your demand letter) that some "other candidates" havecomplained about the use of the logo does not show any likelihood of confusion about source orsponsorship. It is, indeed, regrettable that your letter shows so little confidence in the intelligenceof your client's constituents. The citizens of Mesa are surely used to the fact that there are periodicelections for city offices and that, even if some candidates are supported by the incumbent officialswho employ you and support Whittaker's electoral adversary (and who, indeed, are displayed on thatcandidate's web site wearing lapel pins bearing the city logo), candidates are not sponsored orendorsed by the city government itself.
But there is one more important reason why your client should withdraw its claims: litigatingthe claims could result in the cancellation of your client's trademark. In my letter so far, I haveindulged the assumption that your client has consistently made, and on which your letter rests: thatthe three-tier logo is effectively Mesa's city insignia. But your demand letter performs a cleversleight of hand--you say that you are writing on behalf of the "City of Mesa Municipal DevelopmentCorporation," which you say will be referenced as "City of Mesa"; then you go on to talk about howthe logo belongs to the City of Mesa. But it does not, and it cannot. Section 2(b) of the Lanham Act,15 U.S.C. 1052(b), provides that no mark may be registered if it "consists of or comprises the flagor coat of arms or other insignia of . . . any State or municipality." That is no doubt why, instead ofseeking to register the three-tier logo on behalf of the City of Mesa as a city insignia, you securedRegistration No. 4,073,776 as counsel for the City of Mesa Municipal Development Corporation,and only for such specialized services as construction planning, library services, utility services andthe like. You made no claim that this would be a mark for political campaign purposes, and no claimthat it would be a general city logo. Yet the repeated contentions by Mikkelsen and Smith, andindeed by your own letter, that this is the city's logo, are flatly inconsistent with the limited purposesfor which this logo was registered. If we have to litigate this case, the record will only draw publicattention to how your client is trying to expand the rights conferred by the federal registration beyondwhat the Lanham Act allows, and, indeed, in a manner that runs afoul of the First Amendment."Trademark law is not properly employed to stifle discussion." Renna v. Cly. of Union, NJ, 88 F.Supp. 3d 310, 322 (D.N.J. 2014)Believe it or not, the letter goes on to twist the screws even more tightly. One hopes the city of Mesa and its attorneys get the message and rethink their decision.
Indeed, I suggest you pay careful attention to the Renna decision, which discusses the reasonswhy First Amendment limits on govemment's right to suppress speech about itself make trademarkrights inappropriate for municipal insignia, whether asserted as registered rights or unregisteredrights.
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