Article 6FPCN Mathematician Warns US Spies May be Weakening Next-gen Encryption

Mathematician Warns US Spies May be Weakening Next-gen Encryption

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mrpg
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upstart writes:

Mathematician warns US spies may be weakening next-gen encryption:

A prominent cryptography expert has told New Scientist that a US spy agency could be weakening a new generation of algorithms designed to protect against hackers equipped with quantum computers.

Daniel Bernstein at the University of Illinois Chicago says that the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is deliberately obscuring the level of involvement the US National Security Agency (NSA) has in developing new encryption standards for "post-quantum cryptography" (PQC). He also believes that NIST has made errors- either accidental or deliberate- in calculations describing the security of the new standards. NIST denies the claims.

"NIST isn't following procedures designed to stop NSA from weakening PQC," says Bernstein. "People choosing cryptographic standards should be transparently and verifiably following clear public rules so that we don't needto worry about their motivations. NIST promised transparency and then claimed ithad shown all its work, but thatclaim simply isn't true."

[...] Although it is unclear when such computers will emerge, NISThas been running a project since 2012 to standardise a new generation of algorithms that resist their attacks. Bernstein, who coined the term post-quantum cryptography in 2003 to refer to these kinds of algorithms, says theNSA is actively engaged in putting secret weaknesses into new encryption standards that will allow them to be more easily cracked with the right knowledge. NIST's standards are used globally, so flaws could have a large impact.

Bernstein alleges that NIST's calculations for one of the upcoming PQC standards, Kyber512, are "glaringly wrong", making it appear more secure than it really is. He says that NIST multiplied two numbers together when it would have been more correct to add them, resulting in an artificially high assessment of Kyber512's robustness to attack.

"We disagree with his analysis," says Dustin Moody at NIST. "It's aquestion for which there isn't scientific certainty and intelligent people can have different views. We respect Dan's opinion, but don't agree with what he says."

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