Professor Files Antitrust Lawsuit Against Elsevier, Wiley & Four Other Academic Journal Publishers
McGruber writes:
Article: https://dailynous.com/2024/09/13/journal-publishers-sued-on-antitrust-grounds/
From Dailynous:
Lucina Uddin, a professor of psychology at the University of California, Los Angeles, is the named plaintiff in an antitrust lawsuit against six publishers of academic journals: Elsevier, Wolters Kluwer, Wiley, Sage, Taylor and Francis Group, and Springer. The lawsuit accuses the publishers of collusion in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, stating that they "conspired to unlawfully appropriate billions of dollars that would have otherwise funded scientific research."
The plaintiff "seeks to recover treble damages, an injunction, and other relief."
The lawsuit, filed in federal district court in New York, can be read in its entirety here. The early paragraphs in which the publishers' "scheme" is described are a good read:
The Publisher Defendants' Scheme has three primary components. First, the Publisher Defendants agreed to not compensate scholars for their labor, in particular not to pay for their peer review services (the "Unpaid Peer Review Rule"). In other words, the Publisher Defendants agreed to fix the price of peer review services at zero. The Publisher Defendants also agreed to coerce scholars into providing their labor for nothing by expressly linking their unpaid labor with their ability to get their manuscripts published in the Publisher Defendants' journals. In the "publish or perish" world of academia, the Publisher Defendants essentially agreed to hold the careers of scholars hostage so that the Publisher Defendants could force them to provide their valuable labor for free.
Second, the Publisher Defendants agreed not to compete with each other for manuscripts by requiring scholars to submit their manuscripts to only one journal at a time (the "Single Submission Rule"). The Single Submission Rule substantially reduces competition among the Publisher Defendants, substantially decreasing incentives to review manuscripts promptly and publish meritorious research quickly. The Single Submission Rule also robs scholars of negotiating leverage they otherwise would have had if more than one journal offered to publish their manuscripts. Thus, the Publisher Defendants know that if they offer to publish a manuscript, the submitting scholar has no viable alternative and the Publisher Defendant can then dictate the terms of publication.
Third, the Publisher Defendants agreed to prohibit scholars from freely sharing the scientific advancements described in submitted manuscripts while those manuscripts are under peer review, a process that often takes over a year (the "Gag Rule"). From the moment scholars submit manuscripts for publication, the Publisher Defendants behave as though the scientific advancements set forth in the manuscripts are their property, to be shared only if the Publisher Defendants grant permission. Moreover, when the Publisher Defendants select manuscripts for publication, the Publisher Defendants will often require scholars to sign away all intellectual property rights, in exchange for nothing. The manuscripts then become the actual property of the Publisher Defendants, and the Publisher Defendants charge the maximum the market will bear for access to that scientific knowledge.
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